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POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
AND THEIR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
BASED ON STATE INTESTACY LAW:
HOW ASTRUE v. CAPATO CHANGES
FUTURE SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
AS TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES
Catherine Kim*
I. INTRODUCTION
A widowed spouse may have a variety of reasons why she wants
to conceive after her spouse’s death.1 A widow can turn to in vitro
fertilization to make “a tribute to one’s deceased partner . . . [, to
follow] religious reasons . . . [,] to know the genetic origin of one’s
child . . . [, to] produce a full sibling rather than a half
sibling . . . [, or] to create a grandchild.”2 However, a recent U.S.
Supreme Court case may impact their decision to do so. Before
Astrue v. Capato,3 courts inconsistently addressed the issue of Social
Security benefits for posthumously conceived children under the
United States Social Security Act (the “Act”).4 The Act states that

* J.D. Candidate 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Psychology, May 2009,
University of Southern California. I want to thank Professor Jan Costello for her encouragement
and guidance in writing this Comment. I would also like to thank Laura Riley at the Cancer Legal
Resource Center for her invaluable feedback. A big thank you to the editors and staffers of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, especially Lydia Lee, Mark Gray, and David Rosenberg.
Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for all their support.
1. Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has
Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It,
21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 358 (2011).
2. Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech Child of
the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 393, 398–99 (2008).
3. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
4. Compare Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a posthumously
conceived child was not a “child” within the meaning of the Social Security Act), Finley v.
Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (finding that denying Social Security benefits to a
posthumously conceived child did not violate equal protection), and Woodward v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002) (holding that in Massachusetts posthumously conceived
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families of deceased workers are entitled to Social Security benefits.5
Some courts ruled in favor of allowing benefits for posthumously
conceived children,6 while others denied such benefits.7 In addition,
the emergence and increasing use of in vitro fertilization and other
assisted reproduction methods have exacerbated the problem of
determining a child’s legal parentage,8 especially when wills omit
posthumously conceived children.9 Courts have, at times, struggled
with deciding whether these children qualified under their deceased
parent’s benefits when there was no consent to or mentioning of
posthumously conceived children under the decedent’s written will
or addendum.10
On May 21, 2012, the Supreme Court finally addressed this
ambiguous issue in Capato and held that posthumously conceived
children are not entitled to Social Security benefits if a state’s
intestacy law does not allow it.11 Instead of following the Supremacy
Clause’s potential to or ability to “creat[e] a uniform federal rule,”
the Court surprisingly deferred to state intestacy law.12 This,
however, created the potential for unequal application of federal
Social Security law to violate a citizen’s due process rights.13
Therefore, to address the potentially great variation in outcomes
based on differing state intestacy laws, the states should adopt the
Uniform Parentage Act.14
This Comment examines and analyzes the Court’s holding in
Capato. Part II of this Comment provides an overview of how
children are considered a decedent’s “issue” only when a genetic relationship is demonstrated,
and consent to posthumous conception and support was given), with Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,
371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that posthumously conceived children are “children” for
purposes of the Act).
5. U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SSA PUBLICATION NO. 05-10084,
SURVIVORS BENEFITS 4 (2012), available at www.ssa.gov/pubs/10084.pdf [hereinafter SSA
BENEFITS].
6. See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599.
7. See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 965–66; Finley, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1103, 1106; Woodward, 760
N.E.2d at 272.
8. Knaplund, supra note 2, at 393.
9. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 360.
10. See id. at 418–22.
11. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2033.
14. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf.
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Capato came before the Supreme Court. Part III discusses the
historical background of Social Security benefits. Part IV explains
how the Court reached its conclusion despite fluctuating precedent.
Part V addresses why the Court’s holding was correct but could
potentially have some negative implications because the outcome of
a case can vary greatly depending on which state statute applies. It
also examines the Uniform Parentage Act as the proper solution to
cure the defects in Capato. Lastly, Part VI illustrates how the Capato
case affects future Social Security benefits cases by reflecting on the
rapid growth of assisted reproduction technology.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Capato arose after Karen Capato was denied Social Security
benefits for her twins conceived through in vitro fertilization after the
death of her husband, Robert Capato.15 The Capatos had preserved
Robert’s sperm after he was diagnosed with esophageal cancer
because the couple wanted more children and his prescribed
chemotherapy treatment would likely have rendered him sterile.16 In
the event Robert became sterile, the couple intended to conceive
using in vitro fertilization; however, they were unable to do so before
his untimely death.17 Eighteen months after his death, Karen used in
vitro fertilization to conceive the twins whose benefits were at issue
in this case.18 Because Robert died in Florida, the administrative law
judge and district court applied Florida state intestacy law to examine
the issue.19
B. Procedural History
When Karen Capato brought her insurance benefits claim to an
administrative law judge, her request was denied. The judge
reasoned that because the case was related to “medical-scientific
15. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2025–26.
16. Id. at 2026.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Capato v. Astrue, No. 08-5405 (DMC), 2010 WL 1076522, at *6 (D. N.J. Mar. 23,
2010), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 631
F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012).
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technology [that] ha[d] advanced faster than the regulatory
process . . . [he] believed himself constrained by applicable laws and
regulations to find disentitlement.”20
A District Court of New Jersey affirmed on the grounds that
“the twins would qualify for benefits only if, as 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h)(2)(A) specifies, they could inherit from the deceased wage
earner under state intestacy law.”21 Because Robert had been
domiciled in Florida, state law specified that “posthumously
conceived children do not qualify for inheritance through intestate
succession.”22
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
opinion by defining “child” under 42 U.S.C. § 416(e).23 Through its
interpretation, the Third Circuit determined that the twins were
“undisputed biological children of [the] deceased wage
earner . . . [, and] his children were dependent or deemed dependent
on [their father].”24
The Commissioner of Social Security, Michael Astrue,
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the Capato
twins fell within the definition of “child[ren]” under § 416 of the
Act.25
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Capato addressed an ambiguity in the Act regarding the
distribution of survivor benefits. The Act states that families of
deceased workers are entitled to Social Security benefits.26 As an
employee works and pays Social Security taxes, he or she earns
credits toward Social Security benefits, which the surviving
immediate family members can receive.27 Benefits cover children
under age eighteen and can include stepchildren, grandchildren, step20. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 628 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d,
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. Title 42 of the United States Code Service defines “The
Public Health and Welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 416 specifies additional definitions of the Social
Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (2006).
22. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
23. Id. at 2027.
24. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 631 F.3d at 632.
25. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027.
26. SSA BENEFITS, supra note 5.
27. Id.
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grandchildren, and adopted children.28 Before Capato, the courts had
been divided in their interpretations of the Act by allowing some
potential beneficiaries to collect benefits, but not others.29 Now,
courts are free to interpret eligibility based on state intestacy law.30
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
Justice Ginsburg authored the unanimous opinion in Capato.31
The opinion reiterated that under the Act, biological children are
entitled to benefits “only if they qualify for inheritance from the
decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory
alternatives to the requirement.”32 Since the statute was written in
1939, “[t]he technology that made the twins’ conception and birth
possible, it is safe to say, was not contemplated by Congress when
the relevant provisions of [the Act] originated (1939) or were
amended to read as they now do (1965).”33
With the statute in mind, the Supreme Court considered a
variety of issues that Capato presented to determine whether the
twins were entitled to benefits: (1) what factors should be used to
determine the definition of “child”; (2) how was state intestacy law
an issue; and (3) whether the Due Process Clause was violated.34

28. Id.
29. Compare Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a child
posthumously conceived through artificial insemination was not eligible for benefits because her
father’s deathbed statement and signature agreeing to accept and acknowledge paternity did not
satisfy the paternity acknowledgment requirement under the Act’s provision allowing a child to
be deemed a natural child); Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (reviewing
the constitutionality of the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying claims for benefits
because although the child was created as an embryo during the time of the child’s parents’
marriage, the embryo was not implanted in the mother’s womb until after the father’s death), and
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002) (establishing eligibility if
genetic relationship with the decedent is proven and decedent consented both to reproduce
posthumously and support any resulting child), with Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that posthumously conceived children were children within the Act’s
definition because the deceased father was the biological father and married to the children’s
mother).
30. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2034.
31. Id. at 2025.
32. Id. at 2026.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2027–34.
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A. The Definition of “Child”
While the Third Circuit found it unnecessary to analyze § 416(h)
because the twins were undeniably Robert Capato’s biological
children, the Supreme Court found a major flaw in the Third
Circuit’s reasoning.35
The Third Circuit determined that § 416(h) would be applied
when a child’s family status needed to be determined and § 416(e)
when the claimant was the biological child of a married couple.36
However, the Supreme Court pointed out different variations of what
would qualify under the definition of “child” and determined that
marriage does not “always make the parentage of a child certain, nor
does the absence of marriage necessarily mean that a child’s
parentage is uncertain.”37 “Under Florida law, a marriage ends upon
the death of a spouse,” so, because the Capato twins were conceived
posthumously, they “would not qualify as ‘marital’ children.”38 On
the other hand, the Act qualifies an offspring for insurance benefits
as a “natural child” if he or she meets any of the following four
criteria:
(1) the applicant could inherit the insured’s personal
property as his or her natural child under State inheritance
laws; (2) the applicant is the insured’s natural child and [his
or her parents] went through a ceremony which would have
resulted in a valid marriage between them except for a legal
impediment; (3) before death, the insured acknowledged in
writing his or her parentage of the applicant, was decreed
by a court to be the applicant’s parent, or was ordered by a
court to contribute to the applicant’s support; or (4) other
evidence shows that the insured is the applicant’s natural
father or mother and was either living with, or contributing
to the support of, the applicant.39

35. Id. at 2029; Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir.
2011), rev’d, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012).
36. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2029.
37. Id. at 2030.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2028–29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a) (2006)).
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However, the Supreme Court did not “invoke any of the
alternative criteria as a basis for the twins’ ‘child’ status.”40 Using
state law to determine a child’s status “is anything but anomalous”
because “[t]he Act commonly refers to state law on matters of family
status.”41
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Social Security
Administration’s definition of “child” under § 416(e) must be
interpreted in light of § 416(h).42 When Congress allows an agency,
such as the Social Security Administration, to hold policy-making
responsibilities, it is reasonable to defer to the agency’s interpretation
of its own statutes and regulations.43 Thus, the Social Security
Administration’s interpretation was a reasonable interpretation and
entitled to deference.44
B. State Intestacy Law
In addition, the Court determined the Capato twins’ eligibility to
receive Social Security benefits by looking at the deceased parent’s
domicile state’s intestacy law.45 The Supreme Court addressed the
issue of how the Act applied state law for intestacy limitations.46 This
included “duration-of-relationship limitations,”47 under which a
parent-child relationship must exist for a certain amount of time
before the insured’s death.48 The Supreme Court also discussed
various states’ “time limits,” which range from several months to
years, and allowed states to “treat[] a posthumously conceived child
as in gestation at the individual’s death, but only if specified time
limits are met.”49 The Supreme Court, however, stated that the Act’s
purpose was not to “generally benefit[] needy persons” but to
“provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with
protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the
40. Id. at 2028.
41. Id. at 2031.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2033–34 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)).
44. Id. at 2033.
45. Id. at 2026.
46. Id. at 2031.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2031–32.
49. Id. at 2032 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 58
(Supp. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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insured’s] earnings.”50 The Court recognized that the Act’s
“refer[ence] to state law to determine the status of a posthumously
conceived child[,] . . . adhered to without deviation for many
decades, is at least reasonable.”51 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
complimented the Act for “employing eligibility to inherit under
state intestacy law as a workable substitute for burdensome case-bycase determinations whether the child was, in fact, dependent on her
father’s earnings.”52 However, since the Act will still be applied on a
disorderly state-by-state basis, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion delved
nicely into the need for something more uniform.53 Therefore, as
discussed below, the Court should have taken a further step in
interpreting the Act.
C. Due Process Clause
Additionally, the Capato Court addressed Karen Capato’s
constitutional concerns, especially the need for a higher level of
scrutiny.54 The Court agreed that the “serious constitutional concerns
under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause”
were easily met under the rational basis test.55 Karen Capato had
argued that the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the
Act treated posthumously conceived children “as an inferior subset
of natural children who are ineligible for government benefits simply
because of their date of birth and method of conception.”56 The Court
dismissed the argument because Congress had emphasized that
“[reserving] benefits [for] those children who have lost a parent’s
support, and . . . using reasonable presumptions to minimize the
administrative burden of proving dependency on a case-by-case
basis.”57
50. Id. at 2032 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)).
51. Id. at 2033.
52. Id. at 2032.
53. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cancer Legal Resource Center of the Disability Rights Legal
Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (No. 11-159),
2012 WL 392545, at *10.
54. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 42–43, Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (No. 11-159), 2012
WL 273128, at *42–43).
57. Id. (quoting Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009) (alterations in
original)).
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The opinion concluded that the Act was a viable “resolution of
Karen Capato’s application for child’s insurance benefits by
reference to state intestacy law.”58 The focus on state intestacy law in
the Act thus relieves courts from having to scrutinize on a case-bycase basis.59
V. ANALYSIS
The Capato Court was correct to deny the twins Social Security
benefits based on their father’s earned income. The Act parallels the
state interests and benefits family members most affected by a death,
meaning those that are alive or in gestation at the time of death.60
The Supreme Court justified its reasoning by viewing the Act’s
interpretation to be “at least reasonable.”61
A. Improper Reasons to Conceive Posthumously
The Court ruled correctly because putting restrictions on Social
Security benefits would limit improper reasons to posthumously
conceive. The government implemented survivor benefits to protect
and support family members already depending on the deceased
wage earner’s income while he or she was alive.62 First, it was
important to limit the government’s liability of Social Security
benefits by creating a clear cutoff for Social Security beneficiaries.63
Surely, there is a policy argument that people may abuse the system
for improper reasons, and the government still may have to pay
based on state intestacy law. Because there are so many variations of

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 2034.
Id. at 2032.
Id.
Id. at 2033.
SSA BENEFITS, supra note 5.

Since 1939, the Social Security Act has provided ‘survivor benefits’ to replace the
economic support a family loses after a parental death . . . if the worker’s spouse
provides primary care for an eligible child, the spouse may also receive monthly
benefits until that child reaches age sixteen or is no longer disabled. The amount
payable to a survivor equals 75% of the decedent’s primary insurance amount,
which is the monthly benefit amount that would have been payable to the worker
upon initial entitlement at full retirement age. However, a family maximum
provision limits the total benefits to a family to between 150% and 188% of the
worker’s primary insurance amount. This can be a great benefit to a family.
Carpenter, supra note 1, at 384.
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state intestacy law, the Court should have provided a clearer
definition of “child” and utilized this definition as a limiting
principle to cut off Social Security benefits. However, since the
Court failed to do so in Capato, the states should implement the
Uniform Parentage Act so that the definition of “child” would be
standardized across the states. Alternatively, the Court should
federalize a definition of “child” pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.64
Second, the Court made the right decision because encouraging
widowed parents to posthumously conceive for incentives, such as
financial gain, would be immoral. Receiving Social Security benefits
“without the deceased spouse’s consent is unethical and may violate
a right to . . . procreative liberty. Even if no such rights exist, the
practice should be discouraged on public policy grounds.”65
Consequently, rather than allowing posthumously conceived children
to receive benefits easily, the Court made the right decision to follow
state intestacy law.
B. Constitutional Concerns
The Court determined that the Due Process Clause had not been
violated because Congress’s regime for determining the status of
posthumously conceived children met the rational basis test.66 The
U.S. Constitution asserts that the federal and state governments may
not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.67 The state may deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property, but it must do so by due process of law.68 There are two
kinds of due process: substantive due process and procedural due

64. Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
899, 935 (2012).
65. Id. at 922.
66. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033; Rational Basis Test, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL U. LAW
SCH. (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:23 PM), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test (“Under the
rational basis test, the courts will uphold a law if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. The challenger of the constitutionality of the statute has the burden of proving that there
is no conceivable legitimate purpose or that the law is not rationally related to it. This test is the
most deferential of the three levels of review in due process or equal protection analysis (the other
two levels being intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny), and it requires only a minimum level
of judicial scrutiny.”).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
68. See id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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process.69 The Capato Court analyzed substantive due process to
determine whether the government interest was important enough to
justify the deprivation, and whether Congress’s regime was
sufficiently linked to that interest.70 When determining whether the
Capato twins’ due process rights had been violated, the Court
decided that Social Security benefits fall under property rights, which
include entitlements.71 Here, the federal government passed and
enforced the Act, which paralleled state action.72 Since there was a
deprivation of property, the government had to satisfy due process.73
The Court then applied the rational basis test to determine
whether the Act interpretation violated substantive due process.74
The government’s interest was legitimate because the Act was
intended to provide benefits to the dependents most likely to be
adversely affected by the death of a benefit-receiving parent.75 The
means to achieve this interest, by following state intestacy law
eligibility, was not the only possible approach; however, it was a
reasonable approach that was not arbitrary.76 Therefore, the Act’s
interpretation and application satisfied due process.
In contrast, the Court could potentially have interpreted the Act
as unconstitutional. For example, a longer time period or broader
eligibility standard could encourage and help widowed spouses
exercise their fundamental constitutional right to have children.77
Other constitutional concerns include “discrimination against
children (who have no control over the timing and method of their
conception and birth), their siblings, and their surviving parents.”78
These issues illustrate that there was a fundamental right at stake, so

69. Peter Strauss, Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL U. LAW SCH.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process.
70. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 546 (3d ed.
2006) (“Substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
government’s action.”).
71. Strauss, supra note 69.
72. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025 (2012).
73. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 549.
74. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033.
75. Id. at 2032–33.
76. Id. at 2033–34.
77. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 546.
78. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cancer Legal Resource Center of the Disability Rights Legal
Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 53, at 14.
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the Supreme Court should have applied strict scrutiny.79 However,
the Supreme Court dismissed this argument by stating that the case
involved a property right or entitlement, which circumvented the
need to address the fundamental rights issue.80 Therefore, the Act’s
definition and interpretation are constitutional because the Court
deferred to state law.
C. How the Court’s Reasoning May Lead to Negative Implications
There are, however, several unintended consequences of the
Capato decision, such as unequal application of the Act based on
differing state intestacy laws. The outcome of a case can vary greatly
depending on where the plaintiff is domiciled.
The Capato case would have been decided differently if the
court had applied New Jersey law instead of Florida law. Although
the trial court determined that Robert Capato was domiciled in
Florida and thus used Florida state law to determine the twins’ Social
Security benefit qualifications, many of the factors considered show
why New Jersey law should have been applied.81 First, the Capatos
lived in Florida as newlyweds, but they had married in New Jersey.82
In addition, Karen Capato stated that “their final destination was
going to be New Jersey . . . to try to open businesses there.”83 Robert
Capato had “attempted to incorporate a business in New Jersey to
start opening health clubs there so that, ultimately, the family could
move there.”84 He stayed in Florida to receive his radiation and
chemotherapy treatments, but he even told others of his intent to
move to New Jersey.85 Even after his death, Karen received artificial
insemination treatments in New Jersey.86

79. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 546.
80. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033–34.
81. Id. at 2026.
82. Capato v. Astrue, No. 08-5406, 2010 WL 1076522, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2010) , aff’d
in part and vacated in part, Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir.
2011), rev’d, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id. at *3.
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The Capato twins would have benefitted from Social Security
benefits under New Jersey intestacy law, which has a separate statute
for omitted children in wills.87 The statute reads:
[I]f a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his
children born or adopted after the execution of his will, the
omitted after-born or after-adopted child receives a share in
the estate as follows; . . . (2) If the testator had one or more
children living when he executed the will, and the will
devised property or an interest in property to one or more of
the then-living children, an omitted after-born or afteradopted child is entitled to share in the testator’s estate.88
Robert Capato’s will included the son he had with Karen Capato
during his life, as well as two children from a previous marriage.89
Since his will devised property or interests in property to his thenliving children,90 applying the New Jersey statute to the omitted
after-born twins would entitle them to a share in Robert’s estate.
Furthermore, Robert could have purposefully excluded “passing
intestate succession” through the following New Jersey provision: “I
have intentionally made no provision in this will for any future
children who might be born to or adopted by me and my present
spouse or any future spouse, other than as otherwise specifically
provided in this will.”91 The Drafter’s Notes state that this “statement
should include posthumous after-born, or after-adopted children, to
eliminate the possibility that any such child will be treated as a
pretermitted heir.”92 Therefore, since Robert’s will contained no
specific provision to block intestate succession, New Jersey law
could ultimately have entitled the twins to Social Security benefits.93
Other states, such as Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, South Carolina,
and South Dakota, have purposely excluded posthumously conceived
children to prevent them from inheriting from their deceased parents’
estates.94 Surprisingly, Florida was the first state to recognize
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-16 (West 2005).
Id.
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
Id.
10A N.J. Forms Legal & Bus. § 24:274 (2012).
Id.
Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
Carpenter, supra note 1, at 378.
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posthumously conceived children in probate court “if the decedent
provided for the child in the decedent’s will.”95 Thus, Capato
changes the outcome of cases in these states because they will be
determined on a state-by-state basis.
The good news is that “[c]ourt records show only about 100
other federal benefit applicants in a similar situation as Capato.”96
However, the definition of “a ‘child’ in relation to a parent and
whether current state and federal law [is] flexible enough to
incorporate a growing range of technological conception
possibilities” was left unanswered.97
D. Future Amendment of the Law
Although there is not a tremendous number of posthumously
conceived children applying for Social Security benefits, the number
of families using artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization,
cryopreservation, and surrogacy is increasing as technology
advances.98 The law must adapt to these changes for the future.
Because the Court did not specifically define “child,” similar cases
may soon appear seeking a clearer definition of “child.”
Furthermore, if the Third Circuit’s proposed broad interpretation
of “child” had been used, it would treat all biological and genetic
children equally.99 This presents further constitutional concerns of
“discrimination against children (who have no control over the
timing and method of their conception and birth), their siblings, and
their surviving parents (who did nothing more objectionable than
exercise their fundamental right to procreate).”100 Parental rights
should come at the time when the parents decided to procreate rather
than “at the moment of childbirth or even pregnancy.”101 Therefore,
“when a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which a
serious doubt of constitutionality may be avoided, a court should
95. Id. at 379–80.
96. Bill Mears, Justices Deny Benefits for Child Conceived After Death of Parent, CNN
(May 21, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-21/justice/justice_scotus-posthumousconception-ruling_1_survivors-benefits-children-justices?_s=PM:JUSTICE.
97. Id.
98. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 357.
99. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cancer Legal Resource Center of the Disability Rights Legal
Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 53, at 11.
100. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 15 (citing In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
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adopt that construction.”102 The Capatos determined that they wanted
to freeze Robert’s sperm prior to chemotherapy,103 and this showed
their decision to have children in the future.
However, it should also be considered that full siblings,
including then-living children and posthumously conceived children,
would be treated differently.104 Even though Social Security benefits
are meant for children who had relied on the deceased parent for
support, this could cause other complications, such as the widowed
spouse receiving fewer benefits for the surviving family if the
surviving family includes posthumously conceived children.105 There
simply would be no predictability or finality in the law. The Court
ultimately rejected the Third Circuit’s broad interpretation of “child,”
not because of its unreasonable interpretation, but because the Social
Security Administration’s proposed interpretation was more
consistent with the purpose of the Act.106
E. Possible Bright-Line Rule
Moreover, some states have a broader definition of the Act.107
An ideal legal framework to compare to would be the Uniform
Parentage Act108 because it only recognizes posthumously conceived
children if the deceased parent indicated, in writing, the intent to
have posthumous children and recognize them as heirs.109 Although
some criticize that the Uniform Parentage Act is too narrowly
construed,110 it is a simpler way of controlling the issue and provides
much needed uniformity in the law. There are other frameworks,
such as the Uniform Probate Act, that broadly define the issue;111
however, when a state does not “address the status of posthumously

102. Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
693 (1979)).
103. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
104. Brief for National Senior Citizens Law Center and National Organization of Social
Security Claimants’ Representatives as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, Capato,
132 S. Ct. 2021 (No. 11-159), 2012 WL 416747, at *14.
105. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021.
106. Id. at 2034.
107. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 368.
108. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
109. Id.
110. Knaplund, supra note 64, at 919.
111. Id.
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conceived children in its probate code, a court may look to the
[Uniform Parentage Act] to determine the parties’ relationship.”112
To address the potentially great variation in outcomes based on
differing state laws, the states should adopt the Uniform Parentage
Act. During oral argument, Karen Capato’s attorney referenced a
preemptive federal rule that “a child born four years after her father’s
death would be eligible for benefits.”113 In a cryopreservation and
estate law article, Professor Benjamin Carpenter noted that, because
the issue of posthumously conceived children and Social Security
benefits is still a fairly new concept,
[t]hirty-three states, plus the District of Columbia, still have
not addressed whether a posthumously conceived child has
any interest in the deceased parent’s estate, or whether such
a child can be included as child, issue, heir, descendant, or
similar term under a class-gift provision in a will, trust
agreement, or other governing instrument.114
Therefore, the Uniform Parentage Act suggests that if a spouse
dies “before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased
spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased
spouse consented in a record that, if assisted reproduction were to
occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child.”115 Since the Act is outdated, a uniform rule should be adopted
because “[d]eveloping reproductive technology has outpaced federal
and state laws, which currently do not address directly the legal
issues created by posthumous conception.”116 A uniform definition
of “child,” such as the one used in the Uniform Parentage Act, would
solve the inequity created by differing state intestacy laws and would
provide finality to the families affected.117 Although the Court
referred to state intestacy laws as a way of avoiding case-by-case
situations,118 states should take another step forward by
implementing a uniform statute.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Carpenter, supra note 1, at 369.
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012) (citation omitted).
Carpenter, supra note 1, at 401.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Carpenter, supra note 1, at 350–51.
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012).
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In Capato, the outcome would have differed depending on
whether Florida or New Jersey intestacy laws applied. However, if
the Uniform Parentage Act is used in all Social Security benefits
cases for posthumously conceived children, the outcome would be
predictable and equal for similar cases. The Capato twins would still
be ineligible for Social Security benefits under both the Uniform
Parentage Act and the Uniform Probate Act because there was no
written statement of intent by the deceased father.119 However, even
if the Capato twins did not win this particular case, the Uniform
Parentage Act would still be a better method to determine which
children would receive benefits because it provides a clearer answer
for future cases. As a result, there would be fewer complications in
determining benefits and distinguishing various factors, such as
whether the deceased had wanted children before his death and
whether his place of domicile mattered, because they would all fall
within the bright-line rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Capato Court’s holding will impact future Social Security
cases and add an unnecessary factor for a widowed spouse to
consider when deciding whether to conceive after his or her spouse’s
death.120 The Court interpreted the Act to provide a clearer
framework to prevent people from taking advantage of the benefits
intended for family members whose need was anticipated at the time
of the wage-earner’s death.121 For the time being, the ruling correctly
addressed constitutional concerns and ensured that the Act’s
interpretation was “at least reasonable.”122 However, state
legislatures should modify and update state intestacy law to include
the Uniform Parentage Act’s definition of “child” so that our legal
system can move forward alongside the rapid growth of assisted
reproduction technology. Capato answered many important
questions but failed to address others. Without such a universal
adjustment, cases will come to court to readdress the definition of
“child.” Full biological siblings, born before and after the death of
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 2026.
Carpenter, supra note 1, at 358.
See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2032.
Id. at 2033.
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the decedent parent, may be treated unequally and discriminated
against solely based on the timing of their births.123 In order to
address these issues, either states should adopt the Uniform
Parentage Act’s definition of “child,” or Congress should adopt such
a definition in the Act in the near future to coincide with advancing
technology.124

123. Brief of National Senior Citizens Law Center and National Organization of Social
Security Claimants’ Representatives as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 104,
at 14.
124. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2034.

